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CHAPTER 25 
Evidence 
WALTER H. MC LAUGHLIN, JR. 
§25.1. Exclusion of evidence: Similar crimes. Except in unusual 
circumstances, the fact that a criminal defendant has in the past 
committed a crime similar to the one for which he is currently being 
tried, is generally inadmissible because of the natural tendency of the 
trier of fact to infer that the defendant is guilty of a later crime 
because of his commission of the earlier one. This type of evidence is 
so prejudicial to the defendant that the Supreme Judicial Court has 
held it inadmissible even in a jury waived trial in which the trier of 
fact is experienced in disregarding prejudicial evidence.1 In Common-
wealth v. Nassar,2 the Court continued its zealous protection of the 
accused against the damaging effects of such evidence. 
The defendant had been arrested for a murder 16 years ago by the 
same officers who made the present arrest for the killing of a service 
station attendant. He had been convicted of this earlier murder. The 
arresting officer was allowed to testify over objection in the present case 
as follows: 
I said "Hi, George, do you remember me?" He said "I can't place 
you." I said "Do you remember sixteen years ago George?" and he 
said "Oh, yes" and I said "Same thing as sixteen years ago, 
George" and he said "Yes." Pardon me, he didn't say yes. He 
shook his head in the affirmative.s 
It is important to note that the hearsay rule does not make this 
conversation inadmissible. The accusatory statements were made in the 
presence of the defendant who nodded his acquiescence to them. This 
clearly qualifies them as evidence under the admissions exception to 
the hearsay rule, because the defendant by his action adopted the 
statement of the police officer. However, a record of prior crimes is 
inadmissible even in situations in which it would be only shown by 
inference or in which the acknowledgment of prior crime is made by 
the defendant himself in an out-of-court statement. 
Moreover, in the Nassar case, the Court refused to apply the doctrine 
WALTER H. MCLAUGHLIN, JR., is a member of the firm of The McLaughlin Brothers, 
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§25.1. 1 Commonwealth v. Welcome, 348 Mass. 68, 70, 201, N.E.2d 827, 829 
(1964), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §22.5. 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 887, 218 N.E.2d 72. 
8Id. at 893, 218 N.E.2d at 78. 
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of harmless error to this inadmissible testimony. The defendant, after 
the introduction of the disputed testimony, chose to take the stand 
thereby making his prior criminal record admissible for the purpose of 
impeaching his credibility.4 The Court, however, refused to speculate 
if Nassar would have taken the stand if the earlier testimony had been 
excluded, and resolved the doubt in favor of the defendant. The case 
was remanded for a new trial. 
The Court was disturbed by the clear implication in the arresting 
[officer's testimony that the defendant had previously been accused of 
murder. The Court in another murder case, Commonwealth v. 
Vanetzian/j where the only direct inference to be drawn from the 
conversation between the defendant and the police officer was that 
they had previously met, refused to reverse a conviction because it was 
not convinced that the admission of evidence somewhat similar to that 
involved in Nassar could have appreciably influenced the jury or 
tainted their verdict.6 
In still another first degree murder appeal, Commonwealth v. 
Stirling,7 a case based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence, the 
Court upheld the admission of evidence that shortly before the killing 
the defendant had paid for a gun with a check drawn on insufficient 
funds. The general rule of inadmissibility of evidence of other crimes 
is qualified when the crime shown is part of the "attendant circum-
stances" of the crime for which the defendant is being tried, or when it 
tends to show motive. 
These three recent cases seem to be consistent. The evidence pre-
sented in the Nassar case was extremely prejudicial and only slightly 
relevant, whereas the conversation offered in Vanetzian was so vague as 
not to be prejudicial, and the evidence in Stirling, while admittedly 
prejudicial, was also highly relevant. 
§25.2. Eminent domain: Proof of compensation. It is a basic rule 
of evidence in land damage cases that the trial judge has wide dis-
cretion to determine which similar properties have characteristics so 
much in common with the property being valued that their sales prices 
are admissible and, in turn, which properties are so remote or dis-
similar that evidence of their sale prices would only tend to confuse 
the trier of fact, and therefore should be excluded. Sales which occur 
after the date of a taking, or more precisely· in Massachusetts, sales 
which occur after the "beginning of the entire public work which 
necessitates the taking,"l present especially difficult problems because 
these sales may reflect a value that is enhanced by the very public im-
provement which necessitated the taking. The owner of land taken is 
4 C.L., c. 233, §2l. 
5350 Mass. 491, 215 N.E.2d 658 (1966). 
6 The evidence was that the police officer asked the defendant if he remembered 
him, to which the defendant replied, "No, not again" or a similar phrase. 
7 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 919, 218 N.E. 2d 8l. 
§25.2. 1 Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 6tH, 665,. 157 N.E:2d 209,. 212 
(1959). 
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not entitled to collect for this enhancement. On the other hand, if there 
has been no enhancement, comparable sales after the taking may be ex-
tremely helpful to the trier of fact in determining value. In three cases 
decided during the 1966 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court ex-
amined the discretion of the trial judge in admitting comparable sales 
made after the taking. 
In Burchell v. Commonwealth,2 the trial judge admitted evidence 
of a sale of petitioner's remaining land thirteen months after the tak-
ing, a sale on which the petitioner and his expert relied almost ex~ 
clusively in fixing damages. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the 
trial court's discretion in admitting this evidence, because there was 
no evidence in the record of enhancement of this remainder because 
of the taking of the original parcel. 
Likewise, in Zambarano v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority,S the 
trial judge admitted evidence of the sale of neighboring properties 
which occurred 15 months after the taking for the turnpike extension. 
These properties were located near the Prudential complex which was 
under construction at the time of the taking as well as at the time of 
the comparable sale. However, since there was no evidence introduced 
by the Authority that there was an enhancement in value caused by 
the taking for the extension, the Court upheld the trial judge'S dis-
cretion. 
Alden v. Commonwealth4 involved the admission of a comparable 
sale of adjacent land made five days after, and consummated three 
months after, a taking of a portion of the petitioner's land on Route 9 
for the interchange with new Route 495. The Commonwealth, through 
its experts, contended that the new road and interchange enhanced 
the value of the petitioner's land so that there was no damage, and 
objected to the admissibility of the comparable sale because it reo 
flected this enhanced value. The petitioner's expert testified that there 
was no enhancement because the interchange divided the already 
valuable Route 9 frontage in a manner which made a large portion 
of the non-taken land unusable. The trial judge, in his discretion, ad-
mitted the sales price of the adjacent land, and refused to admit the 
testimony of the buyer concerning his reasons for his purchase. The 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial judge, holding, unlike the 
two cases discussed above, that there was substantial evidence of en-
hancement in value which should have barred admission of the sale. 
While the decision, however, failed to make reasonably clear the basis 
for overturning the trial judge, it appears from the language of the 
opinion that the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the trial 
judge concerning enhancement. 
Both from the excluded evidence of the buyer and from judicial no-
tice that property at the interchange of a limited access interstate high-
way is increased in value because of its location near such an inter-
21150 Mass. 488, 215 N.E.2d 649 (1966). 
81150 Mass. 485. 215 N.E.2d 652 (1966). 
41966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 957, 217 N.E.2d 7411. 
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change, the Court concluded there was a strong possibility that the 
offered sale, even though practically contemporaneous with the taking, 
indicated more accurately the value of the remaining land after the 
taking than it did of the land taken before the taking. 
The Court, however, especially when distinguishing the cases dis-
cussed above, did not use these reasons for reversing the judge's discre-
tion, but rather said that the fact that there was evidence of enhance-
ment was controlling. So as not to close the door completely to the 
admission of subsequent sales whenever the taking authority comes 
forth with a theory of enhancement, the Court suggested that in some 
cases a trial judge under proper instructions could admit evidence of 
a subsequent sale even when there had been evidence of enhancement. 
Just which cases these may be, and the extent of the trial judge's dis-
cretion once any evidence of enhancement has been introduced, is left 
unclear from the opinion. 
The trial judge's discretion in admitting comparable sales of land 
was also attacked in H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Commonwealth./J In that 
case, the petitioner, the owner of a large and successful granite quarry 
in Chelmsford, sought approximately four million dollars in damages 
resulting from a taking by the state of 174 acres of "wild land traversed 
only by hunters," approximately one fourth of which was purchased 
for $1,475 about seven weeks prior to the taking. The theory by which 
the petitioner hoped to show such damage was that the taken land 
had beneath it extensive and valuable deposits of a granite rock which 
could be quarried by the petitioner at a substantial profit. The Com-
monwealth introduced the evidence of the purchase price under the 
sale seven weeks earlier. It was also successful in introducing eight sales 
in the area, made up to six years prior to the taking, which were clearly 
comparable in size and surface characteristics. The respondent vigor-
ously objected because the Commonwealth had not shown comparable 
mineral deposits upon these parcels. Principally relying upon the trial 
judge's discretion, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the admission 
of these sales. The fact that other similar sales had come in without 
objection led the Court to believe that even if erroneously admitted, 
the admission was harmless. 
This case also raised the question of the correctness of the trial 
judge'S exclusion of the petitioner's computations of its potential profit 
from the land taken. The calculations were excluded as being too 
speculative "as a matter of law." The petitioner argued that this lan-
guage meant that the trial judge had ruled that he did not have the 
power to admit the evidence in his discretion. The Supreme Judicial 
Court did not adopt the petitioner's construction of this term and 
suggested other possible interpretations of the phrase. It held it was 
certainly not required to adopt any particular meaning and that, so 
long as the judge in his discretion had the power to exclude evidence 
of the type he did here, then the evidence was properly excluded. 
/J 350 Mass. 316, 214 N.E.2d 721 (1966). 
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Thus in the land damage field, the Supreme Judicial Court during 
the 1966 SURVEY year continued to emphasize the broad discretion of 
the trial judge in the admission and exclusion of comparable sales 
and of other evidence of value. However, the Alden case stands as a 
reminder that if the Supreme Judicial Court either fundamentally dis-
agrees with the trial judge'S conclusion, or is concerned that the jury 
would be unduly confused by certain evidence, it will order a new 
trial. 
§25.3. Exclusion of confessions. Although the subject is covered 
more extensively in the chapter on criminal law, it is important to 
note that the United States Supreme Court in the case of Miranda v. 
Arizona,1 substantially changed the standards in this Commonwealth, 
as in the other states, which must be met before confessions are admis-
sible in evidence. Ever since the Escobedo2 case expanded the rights of 
the accused to be fully warned of his rights and have the assistance of 
counsel, the Supreme Judicial Court has taken a very narrow view of 
the extent of the expansion, generally confining the applicability of 
Escobedo to those cases which fell squarely within its fact pattern. The 
clarification in Miranda of the right of the accused to remain silent 
and to have the assistance of counsel will substantially affect the ad-
missibility of confessions and other statements by the accused in crimi-
nal trials. 
§25.4. Hearsay rule. In the case of Commonwealth v. Massod,1 
the defendant was tried on the charge of using a telephone for the 
purpose of accepting bets. There was evidence that the police entered 
the defendant's premises and answered the telephone each time it rang 
and talked with each caller. A typical conversation was initiated from a 
caller who asked for Brockton Eddy and then said "5-5-0 on Now Do 
It in the 7th at Lincoln." The police officers were permitted to testify 
to this and similar conversations. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld 
the admissibility of these conversations on the ground that they were 
"'highly cogent first hand information as to the actual use of the 
phone equipment,' "2 citing Commonwealth v. Jensky.3 While not dis-
cussed by the Court, this evidence presents a problem of hearsay. It 
can be argued that each of these conversations is merely circumstantial 
evidence of the opinion of the caller that the defendant's premises 
were being used for the purpose of accepting bets. Since the caller is 
not in court to be cross examined, circumstantial evidence of his opin-
ion might be considered inadmissible. 
However, this evidence could also be considered as being offered for 
§25.3. 1384 U.S. 694, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). See Chapter12 
supra. 
2 Escobedo v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964), 
noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.3, 22.2; 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§11.4, 12.1,.12.2, 12.3, 22;1. 
§25.4. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 829, 217 N.E.2d 191. 
2Id. at 831, 217 N.E.2d at 191. 
8318 Mass. 350, 352, 61 N.E.2d 532, 534' (1945f. 1; . 
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a non-hearsay purpose. The conversation of the caller was in effect a 
verbal act, the placing of a bet, and the statement of his words was not 
offered for the truth of any assertion they might contain but merely 
to show that these words constituted the placing of a bet. This in tum 
is circumstantial evidence of the fact that the telephone was being 
used to register bets. If there is evidence of several calls of the same 
nature in a brief period of time, then the circumstantial inferences 
from the words spoken grow very strong and the court should admit 
the evidence. 
The case of Commonwealth v. Gardner4 illustrates another difficult 
hearsay problem involving the reliance of an expert on out-of-court 
statements in the formation of his opinion. The expert in this rape case, 
a gynecologist who had examined the victim shortly after the incident, 
testified that in his opinion the victim engaged in intercourse during 
the twelve hours previous to his examination. He then testified over 
objections that in his opinion there was forcible entry. In response to 
a question posed by the trial judge, the doctor admitted that part of 
his opinion was based upon "a history from the patient as to what 
happened." The Court held this evidence should have been excluded 
because it permitted the expert to base an opinion on areas outside of 
his professional competence - the emotional state of the victim and 
what the victim told him. He admitted that he could not have rendered 
his opinion solely on the basis of his first-hand knowledge gained 
through the physical examination. The Court finally concluded that 
since' members of the jury were capable, equally with the expert, of 
reaching a conclusion on the issue of forcible entry, his opinion was 
inadmissible. It would seem that the point noted by the Court in a 
footnote, the reliance by an expert on hearsay, might be an equally 
important reason for exclusion of the opinion in the form it was 
asked. Although an expert is entitled to rely upon hearsay informa-
tion acquired in training for his specialty, an opinion not based upon 
facts observed by the expert witness or upon facts assumed and put into 
evidence through the witnesses, but rather based upon the facts taken 
on the hearsay of others out of court, is not admissible.5 
The doctor's opinion might thus have been attacked because it was 
based upon hearsay. Since the hearsay facts concerning forcible entry 
were introduced into evidence through the testimony of the victim, 
however, the expert might well have been able to give his opinion if a 
hypothetical question were put to him that assumed as one of its facts 
the truth of the testimony of the victim. 
§25.5. Illegal search and seizure: Seach warrants and valid arrests. 
Ever since Mapp v. Ohio1 rendered illegally seized evidence inadmis-
4; 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 733, 216 N.E.2d 558 . 
. 5 Commonwealth v. Russ, 232 Mass. 58, 74, 122 N.E. 176, 182 (1919). 
§25.5. 1367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), noted in 1961 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §10.4; 1962 Ann. ~urv. Mass. Law §§10.2, 11.7, 21.6; 1963 
Ann Surv. Mass. Law §§10.2, ,21.1; [964 Apq. s\l'rv. Mass: Law §12.2; 19'65 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §§12.2; 12.3, 22.3'- . , , .. . 
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sible in state courts, two areas of the law, heretofore neglected - the 
law of arrest and the law of search warrants - have undergone inten-
sive development. A seizure as a result of a search must either be in-
cident to a lawful arrest or pursuant to a valid warrant to be legal. 
During the 1966 SURVEY year both questions were presented to the 
Supreme Judicial Court. 
(a) Search incident to an arrest. In Commonwealth v. Ballou,2 the 
defendant was convicted of unlawfully carrying a firearm. He was a 
known criminal and an associate of many persons involved in a wave 
of gangland killings. A police officer, one Captain Bulens, acting on a 
tip that the defendant was in the Charlestown area and was armed, ap-
proached the defendant in a very cautious manner, unsnapping the top 
of his holster to free his gun. When he reached the defendant he saw 
no visible evidence of a firearm. However, he lifted the defendant's 
sweater, patted him down and uncovered a loaded 38 calibre revolver 
and then took him into custody. The defense argued that there was no 
probable cause to believe a felony was committed before the defendant 
was searched so that the search was not incident to a valid arrest and, 
therefore, was illegal. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, analyzing the facts in evidence that 
were known to the police officers, concluded that the claim of unrea-
sonable and unconstitutional search had to be balanced against the 
need of the police officers to protect themselves and the public gen-
erally, and found the latter controlling. 
In Ker v. California3 the United States Supreme Court had con-
cluded that states had the right to develop workable rules governing 
arrests, searches, and seizures in order to meet the practical demands 
of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement. The Supreme 
Judicial Court in Ballou emphasized the mildness of the indignity to 
the defendant as compared to the sensible means taken to preserve 
human life. The opinion certainly does expand the right of the police 
in Massachusetts to search without a warrant, since there was no men-
tion by the Court of any probable ground for arrest prior to the dis-
covery of the weapon, which in turn was found by the very search 
attacked as unreasonable. But the decision does recognize the common 
sense rule that police officers, when approaching known danger, should 
have the fundamental right to take steps to protect themselves. 
(b) Search warrants. Prior to the early 1960s, when the presence or 
absence of a search warrant was not relevant in the admissibility of 
illegally seized material, a valid warrant could be obtained by an 
officer as long as, in applying for it, he stated that he believed that cer-
tain premises were being used for an unlawful purpose. He did not 
have to state the grounds for his belief and the issuing authority was 
not required to pass upon the validity of that belief. Obtaining a search 
warrant was a routine formality. The United States Supreme Court, 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 835. 217 N.E.2d 187. 
3374 U.S. 23. 83 Sup. Ct. 1623. 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963). 
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in Aquilar v. Texas,4 invalidated search warrants so obtained because 
the issuing magistrates had no way of determining if probable cause 
for searches existed. 
General Laws, Chapter 276, Sections 1, 2, 2A, 2B, and 2C,5 sub-
stantially increased the statutory requirements for obtaining a valid 
search warrant in Massachusetts. The person seeking the warrant is 
now required to appear personally before the court and give an affi-
davit stating both the facts and the source of the facts upon which he 
relies to establish sufficient grounds for the issuance of a warrant. In 
Commonwealth v. Dias,6 Commonwealth v. Rossetti,7 Commonwealth 
v. Mitchell,8 (a narcotics case in which General Laws, Chapter 276, 
was not directly applicable but in which it was used to furnish stan-
dards), and in Commonwealth v. Coldaro,9 the Court reversed convic-
tions because the search warrants were improperly applied for and 
were thus invalid under the new and stricter procedures. It does not 
appear, however, that the Court felt that prior Massachusetts standards 
were unconstitutional. In Commonwealth v. Owens,lO the Court up-
held a warrant issued in 1963 that was based upon belief of the apply-
ing officer when the official issuing the warrant had before him basic 
facts sufficient to permit him to determine for himself whether prob-
able cause existed. 
4378 u.s. 108, 84 Sup. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964). 
5 Effective, as amended, June 23, 1964. 
6349 Mass. 583, 211 N.E.2d 224 (1965), also noted in §12.2 supra. 
7349 Mass. 626, 2II N.E.2d 658 (1965), also noted in §12.2 supra. 
81966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 485, 215 N.E.2d 324, also noted in §12.2 supra. 
91966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 929, 217 N.E.2d 775, also noted in §12.2 supra. 
10 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 689, 216 N.E.2d 4II. 
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